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The magnitude of marginal costs and markups over marginal cost are
empirical questions of considerable general interest in economics. Micro-
economists are interested in markups because they bear on such questions
as the relevance of alternative models of imperfect competition, the welfare
consequences of market power, and the beneﬁts of new product introduc-
tion. In recent macroeconomic research as well, markups play a central role
(see, e.g., Hall 1986, 1988). Although macroeconomic discourse most often
focuses on the cyclicality rather than the level of markups, the degree of
cyclicality is often limited by the absolute size of the markup (Rotemberg
and Saloner 1986). 
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claimers apply.The estimation of markups is diﬃcult because marginal cost is not di-
rectly observable. There are essentially two ways in which inference about
markups and marginal cost is approached in the econometric literature.
One approach is via the cost function, which is either inferred directly from
engineering data or estimated from cross-sectional or time series market
data. The other is to estimate consumer demand functions and compute the
markup based on estimated demand elasticities, in combination with a
model of market equilibrium. 
This paper takes a quite diﬀerent approach to measurement of marginal
costs and markup ratios. We argue that the price of a “private-label” equiv-
alent or near-equivalent product provides valuable information about the
marginal cost of the nationally branded product. In particular, because the
private-label version would not sell at a price less than its marginal cost, the
ratio of the price of the branded product to that of the private-label one
serves as a lower bound on the markup ratio. The high relative price of na-
tional brands is thus indicative of substantial markups over marginal cost. 
Underlying our approach is the notion that private-label products are
more or less physically identical to nationally branded products, but the
branded product commands a higher market price due to characteristics
not related to marginal costs of either manufacturing or retail handling.
Many of the promotional expenses that vertically diﬀerentiate the branded
product from its private-label counterpart appear largely as sunk, or at least
ﬁxed, costs. Essentially the same is true of expenditure on research and de-
velopment. To the extent that marginal costs of private-label goods diverge
from those of the branded versions, we present evidence that suggests that
manufacturing costs for the private labels are if anything higher on the mar-
gin than those for the corresponding brands. 
Informed by the above considerations and in possession of data on both
retail prices and the retailer’s margins over wholesale, we take the wholesale
price of the private-label product as an upper bound for the marginal man-
ufacturing cost of its branded counterpart. The presumption that retailers’
margins must at least cover marginal handling costs allows inference about
the contribution of the retail channel to full marginal cost. We present sev-
eral ratios that, under reasonable assumptions, bound the true marginal
cost of manufacturing and selling the branded product from above as well
as below. 
We emphasize the lower-bound measure of the true markup. To brieﬂy
summarize our main results, markups computed in this manner are consis-
tent with, but on the high side of, those found in previous studies, for the
few products for which such studies exist. Markups for national brands sold
in supermarkets are large. Lower bounds on markup ratios measured this
way range from 3.44 for toothbrushes and 2.23 for soft drinks to about
1.15–1.20 for canned tuna and frozen entrees, with the majority of cate-
gories falling in the range 1.40–2.10.
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in the literature as a measure of the markup. The texts by Scherer (1980) and
Carlton and Perloﬀ (1994) present some informally collected data of this
sort. A recent paper by Nevo (1997) computes the retail price ratio as a
check on structural estimation of markups on breakfast cereals and ﬁnds a
markup ratio of about 1.30, very much in accord with the estimates from the
structural approach. Our data indicate, in accord with results from previous
studies, that retailers earn higher margins on private labels than on national
brands. This suggests that the retailer’s margin on the branded variety is
most likely the best indicator of actual marginal handling cost at the retail
level. If this is the case, ratios of retail prices understate national brand
markups over the “true” marginal cost of providing goods to the consumer. 
We apply our approach to products in the grocery industry, in which
there are many private-label or “store brand” products in a wide variety of
categories.1 We compute our markup ratios using scanner data from the
Chicago area supermarket chain Dominick’s Finer Foods. The Dominick’s
data include both retail prices and the retailer’s “margin” (and hence, im-
plicitly, wholesale prices) for both national brands and the store brand. This
allows us to decompose ratios of the retail prices into a manufacturer’s
markup and a retailer’s markup on wholesale prices—an exercise that will
prove to be important in our eﬀorts to bound the “true” markup from above
and below. The product descriptions are suﬃciently detailed that we are
able to identify many pairs of national brand and private-label oﬀerings that
are comparable in both quality and package size. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present our con-
ceptual framework. In subsection 7.2.1, we present a simple vertical diﬀer-
entiation model emphasizing the role of sunk advertising costs, consumer
heterogeneity, and competition for “niche” in carving out a role for private
labels and determining the size of the equilibrium markup. In section 7.2.2,
we highlight the role of retail stores and point out how advertising and com-
petition between retailers leads to an inverse relation between wholesale
and retail margins. In section 7.2.3, the most critical part of the analytical
section, we develop a set of inequalities involving the various price ratios
and show how we can bound the true markup both above and below. 
In section 7.3 we answer some possible objections about the comparabil-
ity of national brand and private-label products. Evidence suggests that to
the extent that there are diﬀerences, they point in the direction that prices
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1. Fitzell (1998) recounts that private labels go back to the late nineteenth century and grad-
ually developed from the sale of bulk commodity staples. From the beginning, the main focus
of private-label manufacturers has been on packaged goods—packaged teas, sugar, ﬂour,
spices, and so on. Early in the twentieth century, private-label manufacturers expanded their
activity by oﬀering canned vegetables and fruits, frozen foods, and bakery and dairy products
as well. Later, the private-label industry expanded to include paper products, detergents, deli
items, soft drinks, health and beauty care products, and more recently even “untouchable”
products such as cosmetics, baby food, natural health products, and gourmet delicacies. of private-label products overestimate the marginal cost of national
brands—suggesting that our assumptions are in fact conservative. In sec-
tion 7.4 we introduce the data and discuss measurement methods. In sec-
tion 7.5 we present ﬁve diﬀerent but related markup ratios, covering both
the wholesale and retail levels, for over 230 comparable nationally branded-
private-label product pairs representing nineteen categories. Computing
the lower bound on markup ratios developed in section 7.2, we document
that the markups for national brands are large. In section 7.6 we brieﬂy dis-
cuss our ﬁndings, linking the variation in the magnitude of the markup ra-
tios to the materials share in production cost. We conclude the paper in sec-
tion 7.7.
7.2 Inferring Marginal Cost and Markups From Private Labels: Theory
7.2.1 Vertical  Diﬀerentiation and the Coexistence of Brands 
and Private Labels
We begin with a very stylized example of a market with two ﬁrms, best
thought of as integrated manufacturers and sellers, one producing a
branded product, the other oﬀering a physically identical unbranded prod-
uct. This example is an adaptation of Tirole (1989, 296–98), which in turn
follows Shaked and Sutton’s (1982) model of vertical diﬀerentiation and
price competition. Following Sutton (1991), we regard “perceived quality”
as a function of the stock of past advertising A (“brand capital”). No hori-
zontal diﬀerentiation is possible. The two ﬁrms both produce at the con-
stant unit cost c. Under conditions that guarantee that the market will sup-
port both the branded and the private-label product, we derive product
prices (and thus margins) as well as proﬁts for the two ﬁrms. 
Firm 1 enters the game with a stock of “brand equity” A   A  , which can
be thought of as the return to past expenditure on advertising. Firm 2 has
no brand equity: A2   0. Although all consumers prefer the branded prod-
uct at the same price, willingness to pay for the characteristics associated
with the branding diﬀers across individuals. Let this heterogeneity, which
we might associate either with taste or with income diﬀerences, be parame-
terized by   ~ U( 0,  1), where  0   0, and  1    0   1. The utility of a type
  consumer is U    (1   A) – p if the consumer purchases one unit of the
good with brand equity A at price p, and 0 otherwise. The type   consumer
is thus indiﬀerent between the branded and the private-label good when
 (1   A  ) – p1   – p2. 
When we use a result from Tirole (1989), demands for the two ﬁrms as a
function of the prices p1 and p2 are then 
D1(p1, p2)    1   
p1  
A  
p2  , and D2(p1, p2)   
p1  
A  
p2      0.
168 Robert Barsky, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Daniel LevyAs A   becomes large, the products become less and less substitutable, and
the relative demand less and less price-sensitive. 
Nash equilibrium occurs when ﬁrm i maximizes (pi – c)Di(pi, pj) with re-
spect to pj (i, j   1, 2). The prices, quantities demanded, and proﬁts in the
Nash equilibrium are
p1   c   
2 1
3
   0   A   p2   c   
 1  
3
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Thus, the qualitative results are as follows:
• Firm 1, the nationally branded incumbent, charges a higher price than
the private-label ﬁrm 2. However, both charge above marginal cost. 
• The excess of price over marginal cost, and the proﬁts of both the brand
and the private-label producer, are increasing in the degree of hetero-
geneity in the population and in ﬁrm 1’s stock of brand capital.2
• Both ﬁrms make some proﬁt, although the national brand makes more.
7.2.2  Adding the Retail Sector 
The stylized model above illustrates the role of brand capital and het-
erogeneous tastes for “perceived quality” in providing a market niche for
private labels, and their eﬀect on markups, quantity sold, and proﬁts. How-
ever, we must now add a speciﬁc role for retailers, which are obviously cen-
tral to our empirical analysis of the supermarket data. Lal and Narasimhan
(1996) construct a model along the lines of the above example, but with two
manufacturing ﬁrms, two retailers, and a composite outside good. Their
model is intended to explain why under some conditions a manufacturer’s
advertising can “squeeze,” that is, lower the retail margin while simulta-
neously increasing the wholesale margin, a point stressed previously by
Steiner (1993). 
Stores carry many products, and on any given purchase occasion a typi-
cal consumer buys only a subset of the products. Retailers, Lal and Nara-
simhan (1996) hypothesize, therefore tend to compete more aggressively
based on the prices of a selected set of well-recognized nationally branded
items by advertising these prices to consumers. Since the contribution to
profit from any customer is the sum of revenue from advertised and un-
advertised items, the intensity of retail competition, as is evident from the
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2. That the margin of the private-label supplier is increasing in ﬁrm 1’s stock of brand equity
reﬂects the “principle of maximal diﬀerentiation,” which is not entirely robust (Tirole 1989). prices of these items, increases with the amount the consumer will expend
on the unadvertised items once at the store. This aggressiveness therefore
translates into lower retail margins on these selected items since the retail-
ers expect that consumers, once inside a store, will also buy non-advertised
products on which the retailers receive high margins. Manufacturers who,
via advertising, have established a stock of well-recognized products, are
able to charge high prices to retailers. The higher margin earned by retailers
on their private-label products compared with national brands is an impor-
tant feature of the data we examine.
If the retail level of the channel is very competitive, retail margins are not
likely to be much larger than handling costs. Many authors (such as Levy et
al. 1998; Levy, Dutta, and Bergen 2002) suggest that the retail grocery in-
dustry is indeed very competitive. Retail margins on branded products are
in fact very small for most product groups in our data set. 
7.2.3  Lower Bounds for Markups: Algebra3
The “ideal” measure of the markup ratio—that which measures the ex-
tent to which quantity consumed falls short of the ﬁrst best optimum—is
the price paid by the consumer relative to the full marginal cost of supply-
ing an extra unit. Denote the marginal production cost faced by the brand
manufacturer as cp
b and the marginal cost the retailer faces in stocking and
selling the branded product—the “marginal handling cost”—as ch
b.4 The
“full” marginal cost of providing a unit of the branded product is thus
(1) cb   cp
b   ch
b.
Consequently, we deﬁne the true markup as









bdenotes the retail price of the branded product. In this subsection,
we show how to bound this ideal measure in terms of quantities that we are
able to observe directly in the data on retail price and store margins. 
In line with evidence presented in section 7.3, we postulate that the mar-
ginal production cost of the private label (denoted by g) is not less than that
of the brand, that is, 
(3) cp
b   cp
g.
Because the manufacturer of the private label will not normally sell at a
wholesale price less than its marginal production cost, we have
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3. This section owes a major debt to our discussant, Julio Rotemberg. 
4. Note that we do not make the assumption that cp
bandch
bare constant unit costs. We do not
need this assumption in our empirical work, because we are using price data to make bound-
ing arguments rather than to arrive at point estimates of marginal costs. In particular, if there
are ﬁxed costs in production or selling that must be covered, the wholesale price and the retail
price will overestimate marginal costs. (4) cp
g   pg
w
Combining equations (3) and (4), we have
(5) cp
b   pg
w. 
Thus, the wholesale price of the private label is an upper bound on the mar-
ginal manufacturing cost of the brand. 
Likewise, the retailer’s margin on the branded product should at least
cover the marginal handling costs. Letting 
(6) mr
b   pr
b   pb
w,
where pb
w denotes the wholesale price of the branded product, we have
(7) ch
b   mr
b.
The degree to which mr
b overstates marginal handling costs depends on
the ability of the brand manufacturer to extract, on the margin, the rents as-
sociated with its brand equity. In the limit, the brand manufacturer extracts
all of the rents, and mr
b equals the retailer’s true marginal handling cost.5
However, since we are seeking lower boundsfor the “true” markup, the logic
of our argument does not in any way depend on such an assumption. Our
bounds will of course be tighter if the marginal proﬁt earned by the store on
brand name goods is small. This is normally the case in practice since, as we
will see in section 7.5, for all but a few product categories the observed mr
b—
which must be the sum of true marginal handling cost and the store’s mar-
ginal proﬁt—is itself small. 
Adding equations (5) and (7), we see that 
(8) cb   cp
b   ch
b   pg
w   mr
b. 
Deﬁne a new ratio   ˆa s















b   pb
w   ,
where the latter equality follows from equation (6). Recalling the deﬁnition
of the unobservable “true” markup as  ∗   pr
b/cp
b   ch
b from equation (2),
the inequality in equation (8) implies that 
(10)   ˆ    ∗.
Equation (10) is the result most central to our empirical analysis because it
implies that   ˆ is a lower bound on the “true” or “ideal” markup. Moreover,
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5. There exist some handling cost data in marketing studies that focus on direct product
proﬁtability issues. Although we have not yet obtained these cost data, they would allow us to
see just how conservative our assumptions about handling costs are. Because our primary fo-
cus in this paper is on constructing a lower bound on the “ideal” markup, the main thrust of
the paper would remain unchanged. See Chen et al. (1999) and Marsh Super Study Special Re-
port (Progressive Grocer,December 1992 and January 1993) for details. We thank Jim Hess for
informing us about the existence of such data.it shows how to construct a lower bound on the markup ratio using data di-
rectly available in the Dominick’s data set. We will refer to the ratio   ˆ as our
preferred lower-bound markup because, as we show immediately below, it is
a tighter lower bound for  ∗ than is the ratio of the retail prices. 
7.2.4 Relationship  of    and to Retail and Wholesale Price Ratios
It is interesting to compare the preferred markup measure   ˆ to the retail
price ratio pr
b/pr
g and to the wholesale price ratio pb
w/pg
w—the former because
retail prices are available in a wide variety of data sets (whereas data on re-
tailer’s margins are less common), and the latter because it is a lower bound






g   pr
g – pg
w. As section 7.5 shows, in the data it is almost al-
ways the case that
(11) mr
b   mr
g, 
that is, the retailer earns less revenue net of the wholesale price from selling
a unit of the national brand than from selling a unit of the comparable
private label. When equation (11) holds, we can see, by combining equa-
tions (8) and (11), and using equations (5) and (7), that
(12) cb   cp
b   ch
b   cp
b   mr
b   pg
w   mr
g   pr
g.
The retail price of the private label is an upper bound for the full marginal
cost of the brand; it is, however, a less tight upper bound than the preferred
marginal cost measure that appears in the denominator of   ˆ.  H e nce, the
markup measure based on retail prices,  r   pr
b/pr
g, is a lower bound for the
true markup  ∗ and understates  ∗ to a greater extent than does   ˆ.  
Finally, it is easy to see that the markup measure based on wholesale
prices,  w   pb
w/pg
w, satisﬁes  w    ˆ.   Recall that   ˆ   pr
b/pg
w   mr
b. To go from
  ˆ to  w, we subtract mr
b from both the numerator and the dominator. Since
markup ratios exceed unity, the subtraction has a larger percentage eﬀect
on the denominator than the numerator. It is not, however, possible to say
that  w is unambiguously an upper bound for  ∗, because we don’t know
the extent to which pg
w and mr
b exceed, respectively, the true marginal pro-
duction cost and marginal handling cost of the national brand. 
In summary, we report ﬁve markup ratios:
1.   ˆ   pr
b/pg
w   mr
b, the “preferred” lower-bound measure of the full
markup on the brand,
2.  r   pr
b/pr
g, the lower-bound measure of the full markup based on re-
tail prices,
3.  w pb
w/pg
w, the lower-bound measure of the manufacture’s markup ra-
tio based on wholesale prices, 
4.  b   pr
b/pb
w   mr
b/pb
w   1, the “retailer’s markup” ratio on the brand,
and ﬁnally,




w 1, the “retailer’s markup” ratio on the private label.
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pr
b/cp
b   ch
b, satisfy the inequalities
 r    ˆ    w
and
 r    ˆ    ∗.
In table 7.1, we summarize the algebraic notation used in this section for
deriving the lower bounds on the markup ratio.
7.3 Branded and Private-Label Products: Issues of Comparability
In section 7.2, we established algebraic conditions under which the ratios
we report can be considered lower bounds on the true markup. The useful-
ness of our arguments depends, however, on the maintained hypothesis that
neither the marginal production cost nor the marginal handling cost of the
branded product exceeds that of the private-label version. The appropriate-
ness of this assumption is an empirical question whose answer may diﬀer
across product categories. In this section we consider three potential objec-
tions to the approach in this paper:
• Private-label goods are inferior products produced at lower cost using
cheap, low-quality inputs (the “physical quality” objection).
• Diﬀerences in production technique, scale, and factor prices make
variable costs in the manufacturing process noncomparable even when
the ﬁnal outputs are comparable (the “production method” objection).
• Even if the private-label product is physically comparable to the na-
tionally branded version, the activities of advertising and otherwise
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Table 7.1 Notation Used in Deriving the Lower Bounds for Markups
cp
b Marginal production cost of the branded product
cp
g Marginal production cost of private label
ch
b Retailer’s “marginal handling cost” of the branded product
cb The “Full” marginal cost of providing a unit of the branded product
pr
b Retail price of the branded product
pr
g Retail price of private label
pg
w Wholesale price of private label
pb
w Wholesale price of the branded product
mr
b Retailer’s margin on branded product
mr
g Retailer’s margin on private label
 ∗ The “true” or the “ideal” markup
  ˆT he “preferred” lower bound on the “true” markup
 r The lower-bound markup based on retail prices
 w The lower-bound markup based on wholesale prices
 b The retailer’s markup on the branded product
 g The retailer’s markup on private labelpromoting the national brand (and perhaps also expenditures on re-
search and development) may create additional marginal costs for na-
tional brands (the “marketing cost” objection).
All three of these objections concern the comparability of the national
brand and the store brand versions, and all potentially call into question the
supposition that marginal production and marketing costs for the private-
label product are at least as great as those for their branded counterparts. In
the three subsections that we follow, we take up these objections in turn. 
7.3.1 Physical  Quality
This subsection has two purposes. First, it presents evidence that private-
label products are not in general of lower physical quality than the corre-
sponding national brands. For the purposes of this paper, this is of interest
not in and of itself, but because a ﬁnding of low quality in tests by quality
control managers and consumer organizations might indicate the use of
lower quality inputs, and hence lower marginal cost. 
Second, although private-label products are not in general physically in-
ferior, there is some evidence of variation in the relative quality of brands
and private labels across product categories. Thus we discuss in this section
our eﬀorts to weed out categories in which there are in fact problems of
comparability that make it diﬃcult to construct matching pairs of physi-
cally identical products. 
Branded and private-label versions of a product cannot be economically
identical,as that would violate the law of one price. The ﬁrst objection from
the earlier list concerns possible diﬀerences in the quality of the physical
product and not diﬀerences in “perceived quality” associated with sunk ad-
vertising costs, as discussed by Sutton (1991). Further, because the relevant
concern is with diﬀerences in marginal costs, it is in fact not necessary that
the private-label product be of equal physical quality in all respects. Supe-
rior designs or propriety formulas that do not aﬀect marginal cost do not
pose a problem. We focus on “quality” to the extent that low quality of the
private-label product is suggestive of the use of lower cost inputs. We iden-
tify product categories in which this appears to be an issue, and we avoid
these in the empirical work reported in sections 7.4 and 7.5.
Hoch and Banerji (1993) note the absence of a secondary data source on
private-label quality comprehensive enough to cover all the SAMI (Selling
Areas Marketing, Inc.) product categories. For example, Consumer Reports
does not have quality ratings for all the products included in our data set.
Therefore, it undertook a survey of quality assurance managers at the ﬁfty
largest supermarket chains and grocery wholesalers in the United States
(according to Thomas Food Industry Register). These experts typically have
a graduate education in food science and wide experience testing numerous
product categories. For each of the original SAMI categories the managers
174 Robert Barsky, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Daniel Levywere asked: “How does the quality of the best private-label supplier com-
pare to the leading national brands in the product category?” The respon-
dents gave a rating on a ﬁve-point scale: a “1” suggests that private labels
are much worse in quality than the national brands, whereas a “5” suggests
that the private-label quality is fully comparable to that of the national
brand.6 In table 7.2, we report the means of these survey-based quality rat-
ings for each of the categories that we examine in the Dominick’s data. 
Hoch and Banerji’s (1993, 62) own evaluation of the evidence is that “the
overriding sentiment of these experts was that quality of the best private la-
bel was quite close to that of the national brands.” This is consistent with in-
dustry observers (e.g., Quelch and Harding 1996; Fitzell 1998) who suggest
that although over the long haul private-label products have not consis-
tently exhibited the uniformly high quality standards as national brands, in
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6. Hoch and Banerji contacted each of these managers by telephone to solicit their partici-
pation and followed up with a questionnaire. Thirty-two people (64 percent) returned the sur-
vey, resulting in twenty-ﬁve usable sets of responses (50 percent). The experts received a one-
page set of instructions explaining what is meant by each question and how to use the scales.
They were instructed to evaluate “objective” quality rather than quality as perceived by cus-
tomers. 
Table 7.2 Product Quality Ratings by Category




















Soft Drinks  4.0
Source: Hoch and Banerji (1993), unpublished data.
Notes:Quality ratings range from 1 to 5. “1” means that the private label is much worse in qual-
ity than the corresponding national brand, while “5” means that the private-label quality is
fully comparable to that of national brand.recent years private-label products have signiﬁcantly improved in quality
and packaging enhancements, making them comparable to the national
brands. The quality comparability of private-label products in these cate-
gories is further reinforced by a survey that asks consumers about their per-
ceptions of the quality premium that national brands oﬀer relative to
private labels (Sethuraman and Cole 1997). This study ﬁnds that consumers
are willing to pay a price premium for national brands even though they are
aware that the price premiums do not reﬂect corresponding quality diﬀer-
ences.
It is important to stress that the label “Dominick’s Finer Foods” is in it-
self a kind of branding that diﬀerentiates the supermarket chain’s products
from true generics. The very particular sort of branding practiced by Do-
minick’s and other supermarket chains makes no attempt to provide the
utility-yielding associations that are the object of much national advertis-
ing. It may, however, do a very good job of assuring physical quality. Ac-
cording to Fitzell (1998), private-label owners do not compromise on qual-
ity because they cannot really aﬀord to put a store name or their own brand
name on a product that may be considered inferior. Use of a name such as
Dominick’s serves a bonding function: if one good (or the services of one
store) proves to be inferior or unpalatable, there is a spillover on the credi-
bility of all goods and all stores carrying that label. 
Finally, we can use Hoch and Banerji’s private-label quality ratings along
with other information to identify categories in which quality diﬀerences
are more likely so that we can learn whether or not the quality diﬀerences
are likely to indicate lower variable costs for the private-label version. To
that end we undertook further study of the two product categories that were
ranked lowest by Hoch and Banerji’s survey and that are also included in
the Dominick’s data: bathroom tissue and soft drinks. 
Bathroom Tissue
This was one of the lowest-rated categories in terms of quality compara-
bility. Thus the higher markups may, in this category, represent true input
quality diﬀerences and therefore diﬀerences in marginal costs. There exists
a recent Consumer Reports article on bathroom tissue as well as recent aca-
demic paper by Hausman (1999) on the category. Both of these, as well as
a survey of consumer perceptions by Sethuraman and Cole (1997), re-
inforced the belief that this category does indeed have significant quality
variation. The Consumer Reports article reported studies of many products
that ranged broadly from Ultra Plush Charmin to low-quality private-label
products and Scott tissue. Hausman (1999) echoes the claim that some
brands are of low quality whereas others are of high quality. Consistent
with this, Sethuraman and Cole (1997) ﬁnd that consumers rate bathroom
tissue as one of the two product categories for which the quality gap as per-
ceived by consumers is highest. Further, Hausman (1999) suggests that this
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which is likely to lead to higher costs for higher-quality branded manufac-
turers in this category. We thought this might allow us to compare the
private-label Scott, but Scott turns out to have many more sheets per role
than the private label, making it possible that Scott faces higher costs be-
cause of the additional sheets, even if the input costs are the same or lower.
In the end this additional information led us to drop the bathroom tissue
category from this paper (although the price ratios in this category averaged
above 2.0). We were not able to ﬁnd national brand/private label pairs that
were  of comparable quality and for which we were conﬁdent that the
private-label product was not cheaper to produce on the margin. 
Soft Drinks
According to our quality experts, soft drinks are one of the least compa-
rable categories in terms of quality based on quality control manger’s per-
ceptions. To the degree that the quality diﬀerences relate to cost savings for
the private label, this would inﬂate our markup estimates. However, to the
degree that the diﬀerences in quality are in terms of taste or other inputs
into the syrup, they are unlikely to lead to substantial diﬀerences in variable
costs. We include soft drinks in this paper because knowledge of the nature
of soft drink production and distribution suggests that the sources of qual-
ity diﬀerences were not likely to be related to the marginal costs faced by
soft drink manufacturers. In this category the majority of the costs are bot-
tling and distribution. The cost of the syrup is only a very small portion of
the cost of producing soft drinks (Levy and Young 2001).
7.3.2  Production Methods, Scale, Factor Prices, 
and Other Cost Diﬀerences 
Even if the ﬁnal products are physically identical, marginal manufactur-
ing costs may diﬀer because of diﬀerences in production technology, scale,
or the prices paid for labor or materials. We report here some observations
concerning diﬀerences between national brand manufacturers and manu-
facturing ﬁrms that supply output for sale under private labels—referred to
in the industry as “co-packers.”
We interviewed a number of industry experts on private labels. Their
general sense was that for products of equal quality, the variable costs of
producing private labels were likely to be at least as high as, and probably
higher than, the corresponding costs for national brands. The general
tenor of the responses we received is captured by the following comment
from the vice-president of a major private-label food broker: “National
brands should be able to physically produce at a lower cost....   [T]hey are
able to negotiate lower prices on components and vertically integrate to
carry out processes themselves rather than having to buy at higher mar-
ginal cost.”
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packers and its implications for marginal costs. 
Types of Private-Label Manufacturers
As spelled out on the web page of the Private Labels Manufacturers As-
sociation, private-label manufactures fall into four categories:
1. Large national brand manufacturers that utilize excess plant capacity
to supply store brands 
2. Small, quality manufacturers that specialize in particular product
lines and concentrate on producing store brands almost exclusively. Often,
these companies are owned by corporations that also produce national
brands. 
3. Major retailers and wholesalers that own their own manufacturing fa-
cilities and provide store brand products for themselves 
4. Regional brand manufacturers that produce private-label products for
speciﬁc markets
In general, private-label manufacturers are smaller, more regional, and
more fragmented than their national brand counterparts. Indeed, accord-
ing to Fitzell (1998), as private-label manufacturing evolved in the United
States, the trend has been more toward smaller manufacturers and proces-
sors. As a result, the national brand business, with its high costs of product
development and marketing, was left to the larger manufacturers. For ex-
ample, some of the producers for TOPCO (which handles distribution for
what is perhaps the largest private-label program in the country) are large
enough to produce and market products successfully under their own
brands. In many cases, however, it turns out that they are small or medium-
sized producers that lack the necessary ﬁnancial strength or organizational
structure to market their own brand products eﬀectively when facing strong
national competitors (Fitzell 1998).
We interviewed at some length a production manager at a large branded
manufacturer in the consumer packaged goods industry. Although he pre-
ferred to remain anonymous, he expressed the belief that everything he
shared with us is common knowledge in the industry. 
This manager noted that at one time or another, most co-packers produce
for branded manufacturers. To that end, private-label manufacturers would
have access to the same equipment and techniques as manufacturers of the
brand because they must meet the quality standards of the national brand
manufacturers for which they produce. Further, he said, branded manufac-
turers supply some of the equipment for their co-packers. These observa-
tions are also found in the Federal Trade Commission complaint against the
proposed merger of General Mills with Ralcorp, which was at the time (1997)
both the ﬁfth largest supplier of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal for sale under
a national brand name and the largest producer of private-label cereals. 
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tive production cost, which he called throughput, crewing, and wage rates.
Throughput appears to be industry terminology for number of units pro-
duced per hour, and crewing apparently refers to labor intensity. It is not
clear that these are entirely separate considerations from the point of view
of microeconomic theory, but we will try to stick as closely as possible to the
terminology used by the interviewee. 
The manager contended that throughput for branded manufacturers is
signiﬁcantly higher than for co-packers, whereas crewing is indicative of
greater automation and lower labor intensity in production of branded
products. First and foremost, private-label manufacturers are smaller in
scale. Second, private-label manufacturers, by the nature of their business,
need to be more ﬂexible with respect to the quantities they produce. They
often supply multiple private labels, and uncertain demand calls for a de-
gree of ﬂexibility that limits their ability to beneﬁt from large-scale produc-
tion runs and the economies of scale of the brand manufacturer. This leads
to lower line speeds and lower throughput for private-label manufacturers. 
As to crewing, branded product factories have greater automation than
private-label factories, an observation that the manager regarded as central
to his belief that brand manufacturers produce at a lower variable cost. Rel-
ative to the private-label manufacturers, branded ﬁrms have fewer employ-
ees and more equipment per unit of output. Wage rates, on the other hand,
work in the opposite direction: here, brand manufacturers are at a cost dis-
advantage. They are more likely to use union workers, which raises cost, in
terms of wages and beneﬁts. This is closely related to the “large ﬁrm eﬀect”
on wages in the academic literature (Brown and Medoﬀ 1989). The man-
ager’s sense was that the throughput advantage roughly oﬀset the wage dis-
advantage for an equal crew size. However, the branded manufacturer had
a suﬃciently lower labor intensity—a crewing advantage—that more than
oﬀset the higher wages. 
The value of size for national brands has been noted in academic studies
as well. For example, Schmalensee (1978) has shown that national brands
beneﬁt from the substantial economies of scale in production and advertis-
ing that accrue through national distribution in the cereal category. Like-
wise, Brown and Medoﬀ (1991) have shown that larger buyers receive sub-
stantial quantity discounts on their purchases, although this advantage is
again oﬀset to a greater or lesser extent by higher wage costs.
In sum, industry experts as well as academic articles regard the prepon-
derance of the evidence as indicating that marginal costs for private-label
products are at least as high as—and in many cases higher than—marginal
costs for the national brands with which they are paired. This conclusion
supports our use of wholesale prices of private-label goods as upper bounds
for the marginal manufacturing cost of the corresponding brand name
products.
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A third potential diﬀerence between national brands and private labels
concerns costs of product introduction and marketing. Industry sources in-
dicate that in general private-label manufacturers do far less in terms of re-
search and development (R&D), advertising, trade promotion, and con-
sumer promotion than national brands. For example, Fitzell (1998) states
that national brand businesses have high costs of product development and
marketing.
This leaves us with the remaining question of how large these costs are
and whether they are ﬁxed or variable costs in nature. We argue that R&D
is a sunk cost and that national advertising expenditure constitutes pre-
dominantly a ﬁxed cost, much but not all of which can be regarded as sunk
in the sense of Sutton (1991). This leaves trade promotion spending and
consumer promotion spending as possible variable cost diﬀerences we must
consider. Notice that the largest eﬀect of both trade promotions and con-
sumer promotions is the reduced price the manufacturer receives from the
promotions. Thus, they aren’t marginal cost diﬀerences but adjustments to
the prices the manufacturer receives that we must consider. There are addi-
tional costs of implementing the promotional programs that we should also
consider.
Research and Development
Research and development is one area in which private labels and na-
tional brands diﬀer substantially. For example, according to Fitzell (1982),
R&D expenditures of private-label manufacturers usually are substantially
lower than the expenditures of the national brand manufacturers. The man-
agers of national brands see these kinds of expenditures as critical to main-
taining their brand equity. Clearly R&D spending for new product devel-
opment is not marginal for products being sold in grocery chains.
According to Monroe (1990), as well as many other authors, R&D costs do
not vary with the (sales) activity and are not easily traceable to a product or
segment, and therefore they should be treated as ﬁxed from our perspec-
tives.
Advertising
Advertising spending is another major diﬀerence between national
brands and private labels. National brands invest large amounts of money
in advertising. For example, in the survey of Leading National Advertisers
in Advertising Age magazine (2000), it is reported that advertising spending
for major brands is substantial. Further, many brands have been investing
substantially on advertising for many years. Indeed, according to Quelch
and Harding (1996), it took decades of advertising by the strongest national
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restrictions on television advertising may help explain the strength of
private labels in Europe relative to the United States because “regulated tel-
evision markets mean that cumulative advertising for brand names does not
approach the U.S. levels” (Quelch and Harding 1996).
This has not been true for most private labels because their owners could
not aﬀord the expense of building their own brand equity by adopting mul-
timillion-dollar advertising campaigns (Fitzell 1998). In the case of the spe-
ciﬁc retailer we are studying, we know that it did not invest anywhere near the
amounts spent by the national brand manufacturers of comparable prod-
ucts, even on a per-unit sold or sales basis, on advertising to build brands.
The question, then, is whether it is more reasonable to treat advertising
expenditures by manufacturers as a ﬁxed cost or variable cost. If we suppose
for a moment that the branded variant is heavily advertised but the private-
label version is not, the average cost of a unit sold (which includes costs in-
curred by the “marketing department” in addition to those of the “produc-
tion department”) would be higher for the branded product. The question,
put diﬀerently, then becomes whether advertising should be seen as a mar-
ginal cost as opposed to a ﬁxed or sunk cost.
The best evidence we could ﬁnd on this question in the literature is from
the Cox Annual Survey of Promotional Practices (1996). It surveys con-
sumers, packaged goods manufacturers, and grocery retailers on issues of
promotion practice and usage. The particular survey was conducted in 1995
and its participants included 34 percent larger ﬁrms (i.e., those with annual
sales of $1 billion or more) and 66 percent smaller ﬁrms (i.e., those with an-
nual sales of less than $1 billion).
When asked about the share of national advertising programs designed
to support and build brand equity, consumer and trade promotions, and the
like, the survey participants state that they view their advertising expenses
as mostly aimed at building brand equity, which is more of a ﬁxed or long-
run cost. According to the survey results, the packaged goods manufactur-
ers believe that at least 66 percent of their advertising spending is meant to
build their brand equity only. Of the remaining 34 percent, 14 percent of
their advertising spending is devoted to both brand equity and consumer
promotions, 7 percent to both brand equity and trade promotions, and the
remaining 13 percent to brand equity, trade, and consumer promotions. It
follows that up to 80 percent of advertising is related to brand equity. Mor-
ton and Zettelmeyer (2000) also emphasize the diﬀerence in ﬁxed costs be-
tween national and store brands. The advertising required to support na-
tional brands, they argue, implies that national brand manufacturers have
substantially higher average costs than their marginal costs of production.
This is consistent with the idea that advertising by national brands may be
viewed as a ﬁxed, rather than variable, cost.
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Manufacturers also invest heavily in trade promotions. In the Cox survey
they report some industry averages on how ﬁrms in the grocery industry al-
locate their promotional dollars. It looks to be about 50 percent trade pro-
motions, 25 percent national advertising, and 25 percent consumer promo-
tions. Thus, trade promotions are the largest component of manufacturer
spending. Private-label manufacturers do not undertake nearly as much
trade spending, so this is another major diﬀerence between national brands
and private labels.
Fortunately the Dominick’s data already incorporate some of the trade
spending in its wholesale prices, so we have already taken part of manufac-
turer’s trade promotion spending into account in our measurement of na-
tional brand markups. It is likely that there are trade promotions that are
not captured by the wholesale prices in our data. These are most likely
lumpy payments such as slotting allowances, cooperative advertising al-
lowances, and various case discounts and spiﬀs the manufacturer gives to
the retailer. To the degree that they are lumpy and not incorporated into the
wholesale price that retailers are using in their pricing decisions, however, it
is not clear that these expenses are truly variable. Thus, these unreported
trade expenditures may not be as relevant as the trade promotions incor-
porated into the data we use in this paper. However, to the degree that the
unreported trade spending is variable, and substantial, our measure of
markups will be overstated. 
Consumer Promotions
This is also a major diﬀerence between national brands and private labels.
Private labels tend not to use coupons or promote to consumers, as dis-
cussed by Slade (1998), whereas branded manufacturers spend, on average,
25 percent of their promotional expenses on consumer promotions. That is
about on par with the amount spent on national advertising. 
These activities are likely to be either reductions in the price manufactur-
ers receive (as with redeemed coupons) or variable expenses to run the pro-
motion. Although scanner data sets often include some measures of usage
of manufacturers’ coupons, that is not true in this data set. To give the
reader some sense of how important these may be by category, we report the
percentage of sales made using a coupon for all product categories we study
in table 7.3.
In summary, we believe there is enough evidence to suggest that using
private-label product prices to infer national brand costs is a reasonable as-
sumption in this industry. There is reason to believe, therefore, that this
measure of markup can be appropriate for at least some categories and
products in this industry. Further, since the private label will have some
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scale in production, packaging, and negotiation on input prices, we believe
that private-label product prices provide a conservative measure of these
costs.
7.4 Data
We use scanner data from Dominick’s Finer Food (DFF), which is one
of the largest retail supermarket chains in the larger Chicago metropolitan
area, operating ninety-four stores with a market share of about 25 percent.
Large multistore U.S. supermarket chains of this type made up about
$310,146,666,000 in total annual sales in 1992, which was 86.3 percent of
total retail grocery sales (Supermarket Business 1993). In 1999 the retail
grocery sales had reached $435 billion (Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi
2000). Thus the chain we study is a representative of a major class of the re-
tail grocery trade. Moreover, Dominick’s-type multistore supermarket
chains’ sales constitute about 14 percent of the total retail sales of about
$2,250 billion in theUnited States. Since retail sales account for about 9.3
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), our data set is a representa-
tive of as much as 1.28 percent of the GDP, which seems substantial. Thus
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Table 7.3 Manufacturer Coupon Usage by Product Category




















Soft Drinks  2.2
Source: Supermarket Business, 16th Annual Product Preference Study (1993).the market we are studying has a quantitative economic signiﬁcance as
well.
The original Dominick’s data—which have been used also by Chevalier,
Kashyap, and Rossi (2000); Müller et al. (2001); Dutta, Bergen, and Levy
(2002); and Levy, Dutta, and Bergen (2002)—consist of up to 400 weekly
observations of actual transaction prices in twenty-nine diﬀerent cate-
gories, covering the period from 14 September 1989 to 8 May 1997. The
length of individual product price time series, however, varies depending on
when the data collection for the speciﬁc category began and ended. Note
that Dominick’s Universal Product Code–level database does not include
all products the chain sells. The database we use represents approximately
30 percent of Dominick’s revenues (Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi 2000).
The data come from the chain’s scanner database, which contains actual re-
tail transaction prices of the products along with the proﬁt margin the su-
permarket makes on each one of them. From the information on retail
prices and the proﬁt margin, we have constructed the weekly time series of
wholesale prices.
The retail prices are the actual transaction prices: the prices customers
paid at the cash register each week. If the item was on sale, then the price
data we have reﬂect the sale price. Although the retail prices are set on a
chain-wide basis at the corporate headquarters of Dominick’s, there may
still be some price variation across the stores depending on the competitive
market structure in and around the location of the stores (Levy et al. 1998).
According to Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2000), Dominick’s maintains
three such price zones. Thus, for example, if a particular store of the chain
is located in the vicinity of a Cub Food store, then the store may be desig-
nated a “Cub-ﬁghter” and, as such, it may pursue a more aggressive pricing
policy in comparison to the stores located in other zones. In the analysis de-
scribed below we have used all the data available from all stores by properly
aggregating them across the stores. Note that our retail prices reﬂect any re-
tailer’s coupons or discounts but, as mentioned above, do not include man-
ufacturer coupons.
The wholesale prices, which measure the direct cost to the retailer, are
computed by combining the retail price data with the information provided
by the retailer on its weekly gross margins for each product and using the
relation wholesale price   (1 – gross margin percent) multiplied by the re-
tail price. The wholesale prices DFF uses for computing its gross margin se-
ries are constructed by the retailer as a weighted average of the amount the
retailer paid for all its inventory. For example, a proﬁt margin of 25.3 means
that DFF makes 25.3 cents on the dollar for each item sold, which yields a
cost of good sold of 74.7 cents. If the retailer bought its current stock of Kel-
logg’s Corn Flakes, 18-oz., in two transactions, then its wholesale price is
computed as the average of these two transaction prices (no FIFO [First In,
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computations).7
For the purpose of this study, we went through DFF’s entire data set and
identiﬁed pairs of national brand and private-label products. Of the ap-
proximately 350 pairs we were able to locate in the twenty-nine product cat-
egories, we have eliminated a portion of them because of substantial size
diﬀerences. For example, if, say, in the cereals category we compare Kel-
logg’s corn ﬂakes to DFF’s corn ﬂakes, but the national brand comes in a
32-oz. box (which is a family size) and DFF’s product comes in an 18-oz.
box, then the two products are not really comparable because they are tar-
geted to two diﬀerent kinds of customers, and computing prices per ounce
would not necessarily eliminate this fundamental problem. Other pairs
were eliminated because many non-private-label brands did not really qual-
ify as national brand products because these products are marketed only re-
gionally (and some even locally only) or they did not have substantial mar-
ket share. Still other pairs were eliminated because of our uncertainty about
equality of their quality. Finally, we have imposed a minimum on the length
of the weekly time series for them to be informative.
Thus, the results we report in this paper are for national brand/private-
label product pairs, such that (a) the national brand product is clearly mar-
keted nationally; (b) the national brand product is widely recognized; (c) the
national brand product has a nontrivial market share; (d) the national
brand/private-label product pair is comparable in size, quality, and packag-
ing; and (e) the price time series for the product pairs are available for at
least a twenty-four-week period for each of the three price zones. 
The product pairs that pass these criteria represent nineteen categories,
which include analgesics, bottled juices, cereals, cheeses, cookies, crackers,
canned soups, dish detergent, frozen entrees, frozen juices, fabric softeners,
grooming products, laundry detergent, oatmeal, snack crackers, tooth-
brushes, toothpastes, soft drinks, and canned tuna. In the case of the soft
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7. Thus, the wholesale costs in the data do not correspond exactly to the replacement cost
or the last transaction price. Instead we have the average acquisition cost (ACC) of the items
in inventory. So the supermarket chain sets retail prices for the next week and also determines
AAC at the end of each week, t, according to the formula
AAC(t 1)   (Inventory bought in t) Price paid (t) 
  [Inventory, end of t – l – sales(t)] AAC(t). 
There are two main sources of discrepancy between replacement cost and AAC. The ﬁrst is the
familiar one of sluggish adjustment. A wholesale price cut today only gradually works itself
into AAC as old, higher-priced inventory is sold oﬀ. The second arises from the occasional
practice of manufacturers of informing the buyer in advance of an impending temporary price
reduction. This permits the buyer to completely deplete inventory and then “overstock” at the
lower price. In this case AAC declines precipitously to the lower price and stays there until the
large inventory acquired at that price runs oﬀ. Thus, the accounting cost shows the low price
for some time after the replacement cost has gone back up.drinks category, it should be noted that most of the nationally branded
products included in this category are handled by their manufacturers
through various direct store delivery arrangements.8 Thus, the “handling
costs” of these nationally branded products are incurred by their manufac-
turers.9 Therefore, to get a markup ratio, in this case, we would take the ra-
tio of the retail price of the nationally branded product over our estimate of
the marginal cost of the branded product, calculated as the sum of the
wholesale price of the private-label product and our estimate of the retailer
handling cost. We, however, choose to treat the soft drink products and the
rest of the products in an identical fashion by using the same formula for
measuring the markup ratio. Therefore, by including in the denominator of
the markup ratio the retailer’s margin on the nationally branded product,
we are overestimating the retailer’s handling cost by counting the retailer’s
proﬁt as part of the marginal cost. The resulting markup measure for the
soft drink products will, therefore, be even more conservative than for the
rest of the categories.
To compute the average markup ﬁgures for each category, which we re-
port in ﬁgures 7.1–7.6, we had to compress the data by using three diﬀerent
weighted-averaging procedures. First, we have computed the weighted av-
erage of all weekly price series across all the chain’s stores to get a single
weekly wholesale and retail price series for each of the national brand and
private-label products chosen for the analysis. The purpose of the weighing
procedure we have implemented is to ensure that the price series coming
from the stores that sell proportionally more than others receive higher
weight. This averaging was done by weighing the national brand and
private-label price series from each store according to the store’s sales share
in the total DFF sales where the sales are measured by the weekly sales ﬁg-
ures of the speciﬁc national brand and private-label products, respectively.
Since the scanner database does not include information on the quantities
purchased at the wholesale level, we used the retail sales ﬁgures as its proxy.
This procedure likely introduces a noise in the generated series because the
retail sales are more spread over time in comparison to wholesale pur-
chases, which occur with lower frequency. The noise, however, will mostly
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8. Most big retail supermarket stores use some kind of dedicated warehouse channel distri-
bution system for their product replenishment. However, for a number of reasons, the retailers
often ﬁnd it preferable to obtain some products directly from the suppliers or manufacturers
who deliver them directly to the store, rather than via their normal warehouse channel. The
products handled through such direct store delivery mechanisms usually are high-volume,
fast-moving, or perishable products. See Levy et al. (1998) for further details on direct store de-
livery arrangements at multiproduct retail settings.
9. In the remaining ten categories, which include bath soap, beer, cigarettes, front-end can-
dies, frozen dinners, paper towels, refrigerated juices, shampoos, soaps, and bathroom tissues,
we were unable to ﬁnd comparable national brand/private-label pairs. That is, in these cate-
gories we were unable to ﬁnd any national brand/private-label product pair that met all ﬁve cri-
teria listed above.aﬀect the weekly volatility properties of the price series, but the average val-
ues are unlikely to be aﬀected from this procedure in a signiﬁcant way. 
Next, we computed the weighted average weekly values of the above
across-store weighted averaged series by taking each price series for the
sample period it was available and computing its weekly average value by
weighing each weekly observation according to the share of that week’s
quantity sold in the total quantity sold over the entire sample period. As be-
fore, the purpose of this weighing is to give higher weight to observations
(i.e., weeks) that represent higher sales volume measured in terms of prod-
ucts’ quantity (such as ounces). In each case the prices of national brand
products were weighed using the sales volume of that speciﬁc national
brand product, whereas the price series of the private-label products were
correspondingly weighed by sales volume of the private-label products.
These series were then used to compute various markup measures reported
in tables 7A.1–7A.19.
It should be noted that an alternative way of computing these weekly av-
erage markup values for each national brand/private-label product pair is to
ﬁrst compute weekly markup series for the entire sample period covered by
each product pair and then compute their weekly weighted average using
the procedure outlined above. The calculations performed using this proce-
dure have yielded similar quantitative results in terms of the average
markup ﬁgures. The procedure we use, however, has the advantage that ﬁrst
computing the markup ratios and then averaging them over time (instead of
ﬁrst averaging them over time and then computing the markup ratios)
makes it possible to explore the time series variability in each individual
markup series and perhaps also to provide some measure of over-time vari-
ability associated with the markup.
Finally, we have taken the above-calculated average markup ﬁgures for
each product pair and computed the average markup for each of the nine-
teen product categories included in our sample. As before, these category
averages were also calculated as weighted averages. However, unlike the
previous steps, here the weighing was done according to the share of the dol-
lar value of the sales for each product pair in the dollar value of the total
sales in the category. For example, if in the analgesics category we have
twenty-four national brand/private-label product pairs, to compute the cat-
egory average markup, we took the markup ﬁgures for the twenty-four
product pairs (listed in table 7A.5) and computed their weighted average,
where the weights are the ratios of the total dollar sales of the pair to the to-
tal dollar sales in the category. The weights here use dollar sales rather than
unit sales in order to avoid the problem of “adding apples to oranges.” The
resulting category averages ﬁgures are reported in ﬁgures 7.1–7.6 and in the
bottom rows of tables 7A.1–7A.19.
Along with the average markup ratio measures we also report their in-
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product pairs within each category (tables 7A.1–7A.19) are computed by
using the weekly time series of the corresponding markup ratios and deter-
mining the range in which 50 percent of these weekly markups fall for each
product pair. The interquartile range ﬁgures reported for category averages
(see the bottom rows in tables 7A.1–7A.19) are computed by considering
the average weekly markups for each product pair and determining the
range in which 50 percent of them fall for each category.
In the individual category tables (tables 7A.1–7A.19), we identify each
national brand/private-label product pair by the name of the branded prod-
ucts because the private-label equivalents of the nationally branded prod-
ucts listed in these tables are always the Dominick’s store brand products.
Note also that in these tables some brand names appear more than once.
This is because they refer to diﬀerent sizes. For example, in the analgesics
category reported in table 7A.5, Advil (with the corresponding private-label
product) is listed three times because it comes in three diﬀerent sizes
(“counts” or number of tablets): 10, 50, and 100.
7.5 Empirical Findings
In this section we report computations of the ﬁve markup ratios derived
in section 7.2.3. Our primary objective is to oﬀer the tightest possible lower
bound on  ∗, the “ideal” full markup ratio for the nationally branded prod-
uct. Our second goal is to provide a sense of the quantitative relationships
between the ﬁve markup ratios that we derived in section 7.2.3. These ratios
oﬀer insight into the anatomy of   ˆ;  and because they have interpretations
as markups at speciﬁc stages of the production and distribution processes,
they are of interest in their own right. 
In section 7.5.1, we report the results for category averages. We begin
with the “bottom line,” the “preferred” measure   ˆ,  our tightest lower
bound on  ∗. We then move on to  w, the ratio of the wholesale prices,
which usually exceeds   ˆ and is a lower bound on the manufacturer’s
markup. Next, we discuss  b and  g, the retailer’s markups over wholesale
price for branded and private-label products, respectively. These provide the
link from  w to the more commonly observed markup ratio computed us-
ing retail prices,  r, which is the last of the ﬁve ratios that we report. Finally,
we close the section with the presentation of a graph that shows   ˆ ﬂanked
by  w and  r and thus oﬀers an empirical counterpart to the bounding in-
equalities derived in section 7.2.3. 
In section 7.5.2 we focus in more detail on selected product categories.
The category of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, in particular, has been the
object of several studies in the econometric literature, and we are able to
compare our results with available structural estimates. Finally, examining
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insight into within-category variation of the markups.
7.5.1  Results for Category Averages
The “Preferred” Lower-bound Markup Measure   ˆ
In ﬁgure 7.1 we report our “preferred” lower-bound markup measure la-
beled   ˆ in section 7.2.3. The ﬁgure shows that in four product categories—
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Fig. 7.1 Markup Ratio for Branded Products: “Preferred” Lower Bound (Measure a)toothbrushes, soft drinks, crackers, and grooming products—the mean
lower-bound markup ratio   ˆ is on the order of 2.0 or higher. In three cate-
gories—analgesics, canned soups, and fabric softeners—  ˆa v e r a ges be-
tween 1.60 and 2.00, whereas in six categories—oatmeal, cookies, snack
crackers, toothpaste, cereals, and dish detergent—mean   ˆ falls approxi-
mately in the range 1.40–1.60. For the remaining six categories—bottled
juice, cheese, frozen juice, laundry detergents, frozen entrees, and canned
tuna—the average lower-bound markup ratio is less than 1.40. The cate-
gories with smallest   ˆa re canned tuna (1.16), frozen entrees (1.21), and
laundry detergents (1.22). 
Figure 7.1 provides a good deal of evidence that nationally branded prod-
ucts are sold at a substantial markup. In more than half of the categories,
the average lower-bound on the markup ratio is at least 1.40. Since the mea-
sure we report here is conservative, true markup ratios are likely to be even
higher.
Manufacturer’s Markup: Lower Bound Based on Wholesale Prices
As discussed in sections 7.2 and 7.3,  w—the ratio of the wholesale
prices—provides a lower bound for the brand manufacturer’s markup. In
ﬁgure 7.2 we present average  w by category along with our preferred lower
bound,   ˆ.  A comparison of the two lower-bound measures indicates that
with the exception of the toothbrush and crackers categories, the two
markup ratios,  wand   ˆ,   are of similar magnitude. For ten categories—fab-
ric softeners, oatmeal, toothpaste, cereal, dish detergent, bottled juice,
cheese, laundry detergent, frozen entrees, and canned tuna—the diﬀerence
between the two measures is less than 0.1. For seven categories—soft drinks,
grooming products, analgesics, canned soups, cookies, snack crackers, and
frozen juice—the diﬀerence between the two measures is between 0.10 and
0.20. Nationally branded products that have a large manufacturer’s markup
according to  walso have large full markups according to   ˆ.   T his should not
be surprising, as we obtained   ˆf r om  w by adding mr
b—the retailer’s margin
on the brand—to both the numerator and the denominator of  w, and as
we show immediately below, with a few exceptions, the retail margins on
branded products are quite small. This conclusion also holds, for the most
part, within individual categories, as tables 7A.1–7A.19 indicate.
As we move down the list to categories with lower markup ratios, the gap
between the two markup measures becomes particularly small, a direct re-
sult of the algebraic relationship between   ˆ and  w. Thus, although the con-
servative treatment of the retailer’s handling cost embodied in   ˆ is theoret-
ically appealing, its actual quantitative signiﬁcance is not overwhelming. 
Retailer’s Markups on Private Labels and National Brands
In ﬁgure 7.3 we report the retailer’s markup—the ratio of retail price to
wholesale price—for the private-label ( g) and nationally branded products
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Fig. 7.3 Retailer’s Markup Ratio on National Brand (Measure d) and Private
Lavel (Measure e)
( b), by category. According to the ﬁgure, for all but three products, the re-
tailer’s markup ratios for the nationally branded products are all less than
1.20. The exceptions are canned soups (1.46), toothbrushes (1.37), and
frozen juice (1.31). Moreover, the retailer’s markups on nationally branded
products are small both in comparison to   ˆ and  w(see ﬁgure 7.4for a com-
parison of  bwith  w) and in comparison to retailer’s markup on the privatelabel. Speciﬁcally, in all but one category (frozen entrees), retail markups
are higher for private labels than for national brands. Second, in all but one
category (frozen juice), the retail markups for nationally branded products
are lower than the manufacturers’ markups. 
According to ﬁgure 7.3, the retailer’s markup ratios for nationally
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Fig. 7.4 The Lower Bound Markup Based on Wholesale Prices (Measure c) vs.
Retailer’s Markup on NB (Measure d)branded products range from 1.03 for laundry detergent to 1.46 for canned
soups. For more than one-third of categories—grooming products, anal-
gesics, fabric softeners, toothpaste, cereal, dish detergents, and laundry de-
tergents—the average retailer’s markup ratio on the brand is less than 1.10. 
In contrast, the retailer’s markup ratios for private-label products are
substantially higher. Omitting the puzzling case of the toothbrush category
(with a measured retailer’s markup ratio of 4.87), the average retailer’s
markup on the private-label version ranges from 1.07 for laundry detergents
to 1.76 for soft drinks. Only in the categories of laundry detergents, dish de-
tergents, cereals, and frozen entrees are the retailer’s private-label markup
ratios less than 1.20.
Thus we ﬁnd clear evidence that retailers’ markups are higher for private
labels than national brands. This fact is well known in the trade. For ex-
ample, according to Morton and Zettelmeyer (2000), retailers “achieve
higher price-cost margins [on private-label products] than those earned
with national brands. Industry observers, the popular press and academic
work all indicate that this eﬀect can be quite large.” According to Hoch and
Banerji (1993), “Industry sources suggest that retailer gross margins on
private labels are 20% to 30% higher than on national brands.” This diver-
gence between retailers’ margins on branded and private-label products is
associated with diﬀerences between the proﬁtability of American and Eu-
ropean supermarkets. “In European supermarkets, higher private-label
sales result in higher average pretax proﬁts. U.S. supermarkets average only
15% of sales from private labels, they average 2% pretax proﬁts from all
sales. By contrast, European grocery stores such as Sainsbury’s, with 54%
of its sales coming from private labels, and Tesco, with 41%, average 7% pre-
tax proﬁts” (Quelch and Harding 1996).
Lower-Bound Measure of the Full Markup Based on Retail Prices
Previous authors, such as Scherer (1980), Carlton and Perloﬀ(1994), and
Nevo (2001), have focused on the ratio of retail prices  r. Although we have
made the case that   ˆ is a better measure than  rof the markup paid by con-
sumers over full marginal cost, it is useful to report  ras well, both for com-
parison with these previous studies and because retail prices are becoming
increasingly available with the development of new technologies in com-
puters, electronic scanners, and the like.
Figure 7.5 shows the markup ratios for national brands based on the re-
tail prices of nationally branded products and private labels,  r, along with
our preferred lower bound,   ˆ.   T he markup ratio ﬁgures computing using
the retail prices range from a high of 2.33 for toothbrushes to a low of 1.14
for canned tuna. The majority of the markups are below 1.4, the only ex-
ceptions being crackers (2.00), grooming products (1.75), analgesics (1.63),
fabric softeners (1.52), and cookies (1.49), as well as the aforementioned
194 Robert Barsky, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Daniel Levytoothbrushes (2.33). This is in general true within the individual categories
as well, again with the exception of the above categories. Recall that  r un-
derestimates the full markup to a greater extent than does   ˆ,  because  r
treats the handling cost more conservatively by using as its proxy the re-
tailer’s margin on the private-label product. 
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Fig. 7.5 National Brand Markup: The “Preferred” Lower Bound (Measure a) vs.
the Lower Bound Measure Based on Retail Price (Measure b)Summary
To further explore the relationship between our preferred lower-bound
ratio and the lower-bound ratios computed using the wholesale and the re-
tail prices, we plot the three lower-bound series together in ﬁgure 7.6.As the
ﬁgure demonstrates, the lower-bound ratio calculated using the wholesale
price usually exceeds our “preferred” lower bound, whereas the lower-
bound ratio calculated using the retail price typically falls below the pre-
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Fig. 7.6 Lower Bounds on the National Brand Manufacturers’ Markup Ratio: The
“Preferred” Lower Bound (Measure a), the Lower Bound Based on Wholesale Price
(Measure c), and the Lower Bound Based on Retail Price (Measure b)ferred lower bound. The ﬁgure also indicates that the three lower-bound
measures attain values that are closer to each other as the markups’ size de-
creases.
7.5.2  Detailed Results for Some Selected Categories and Products 
In tables 7A.1–7A.19, we report detailed tabulations of all ﬁve markup
ratios derived in section 7.2.3, for each national brand/private-label pair for
all nineteen product categories included in our data set.
Among the nineteen categories, the toothbrush category (table 7A.1) at-
tains the highest average value of our preferred lower-bound markup ratio,
with a category average of 3.44. Within the category, four types of Crest
toothbrush (of diﬀerent size and strength) attain a markup ratio in the
range of 5.48–5.80, and two types of Reach toothbrush attain markup val-
ues of 4.36 and 4.56. The results for the remaining products in this category
suggest more moderate market power, with markup ratios in the range of
1.56 for Johnson and Johnson waxed mint dental ﬂoss and 1.49 for the Pep-
sodent toothbrush.
The manufacturers’ lower-bound markup ratios calculated using the
wholesale prices attain even higher values. For example, for the four Crest
and two Reach toothbrushes,  w falls in the range of 13.00–19.84. Overall,
the category average of these markup ﬁgures is 10.43. The reasons for these
very high measured markup ﬁgures, unique to the toothbrush category, re-
main a mystery. 
The ﬁgures in the last two columns of table 7A.1 suggest that the retailer’s
markup on private-label products in this category far exceeds its markup ra-
tio on the corresponding nationally branded product by nearly an order of
magnitude. For example, for the highest markup brand, the Crest tooth-
brush, the retailer’s markup ratio is only 1.14, whereas the markup ratio on
the corresponding private label is 7.03. Overall, the retailer’s average
markup ratio for nationally branded products in this category equals 1.37,
whereas the average markup ratio for private-label products equals 4.87.
Finally, the lower-bound markup ratios calculated using the retail prices
are more moderate, although for the top four products the ratio still exceeds
3.00, and for another two products it is close to 3.00. The category average
for this ratio is 2.33.
For the remaining eighteen categories we ﬁnd more moderate markup
ﬁgures. Nevertheless, in most categories they are quite substantial. For ex-
ample, for the analgesics category, reported in table 7A.5, the average of our
preferred lower-bound markup ratio is 1.84. Several products in this cate-
gory have especially high markup ratios. For example, the preferred lower
bound on the markup ratio for children’s Anacin-3 tablets is 4.99 (column
[1]). Four other products with especially high markup ratios are Panadol
children’s tablets, with the lower-bound markup ratio of 3.91, followed by
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2.44; and Bayer children’s aspirin, with a markup ratio of 2.28.10
Turning to the manufacturers’ markup ratios calculated using the whole-
sale prices (column [2]), we ﬁnd that they are quantitatively very similar to
the values of   ˆ,  with the exception of children’s Anacin-3 tablets, with a
manufacturer’s lower-bound markup ratio of 7.62, and Panadol children’s
tablets, with a manufacturer’s lower-bound markup ratio of 6.73. Further,
as we move down the list from the highest preferred lower bound to the low-
est, the discrepancy between the two ratios essentially disappears, as ex-
pected. Overall, the lower-bound manufacturers’ markup ratios calculated
using wholesale prices are high. For example, the ﬁgures in the table indi-
cate that for seven of the twenty-four products in this category, the manu-
facturers’ lower-bound markup ratio exceeds 2.00, and for another ten
products the ratio exceeds 1.7. Only for two products, both Tylenol extra-
strength tablets (diﬀerent sizes), is  w below 1.2. Overall, the average man-
ufacturer’s lower-bound markup ratio for this category equals 2.01.
The ﬁgures in the third column of table 7A.5, which measure the lower
bound on the full markup using retail prices, are smaller than the ﬁrst two
ratios, as predicted by the inequalities derived in section 7.2.3. Still, the
markup ratios we obtain for the analgesics category are large. For example,
of the twenty-four products, for three products—children’s Anacin-3 tab-
lets, Panadol children’s tablets, and Tylenol extra-strength caplets—the
markup ratio calculated using only the retail prices exceeds 2.0; for ten
other products the ratio exceeds 1.6, and for another eight products the
markup ratio exceeds 1.3. The average markup ratio using retail prices for
the analgesics category equals 1.63.
Finally, the retailer’s markup on the national brand systematically ex-
ceeds its markup on the private label. For example, for twenty-three of the
twenty-four products (Bayer children’s aspirin being the only exception),
the retailer’s markup on nationally branded products in this category is less
than 1.15, with an overall average of only 1.04. In contrast, the markup ra-
tio on the private label is substantially higher, averaging 1.25. 
Next, consider the cereals category. According to table 7A.12, all of the
markup ﬁgures we ﬁnd in this category are smaller than those we reported
for the analgesics category. As the ﬁgures in the ﬁrst column of the table sug-
gest, here the preferred lower-bound markup ratio falls in the range 1.27–
1.57, with an average of 1.41, again suggestive of very substantial market
power. Total raisin bran attains the highest lower-bound value with 1.57,
followed by Kellogg’s corn ﬂakes, with 1.54, and Post raisin bran and Kel-
logg’s Nut & Honey, each with a lower-bound markup ratio of 1.41.
The manufacturers’ markup ﬁgures reported in the second column of
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10. Ernie Berndt noted that the extraordinarily high markups on children’s medicine might
possibly be explained by parents’ risk aversion regarding their children’s health. table 7A.12 are only slightly higher than the preferred lower-bound ﬁgures.
For example, for Total raisin bran, the lower bound on the manufacturer’s
markup ratio equals 1.61, in comparison to the preferred lower bound of
1.57. The manufacturers’ markup and the preferred markup ﬁgures are
equally close for the remaining products of the category. Overall, cereal
manufacturers on average mark up their branded product prices to 1.43 of
their marginal cost.
According to the third column of table 7A.12, the markup ratios we ob-
tain using retail prices average 1.26 for the cereals category. Total raisin
bran still attains the highest value with 1.46, and Kellogg’s corn ﬂakes’
markup ratio is a distant second with a value of 1.23. Finally, comparing the
retailer’s markup ratio on branded products to its markup ratio on private
labels, we again ﬁnd that the latter, 1.19 on average, exceeds the former, 1.07
on average.
It is instructive to compare our markup ﬁgures in this category to exist-
ing econometric estimates. The category of breakfast cereals has been a
subject of several recent studies, such as those by Hausman (1997) and
Nevo (2001). Nevo presents estimates of price-marginal cost margins under
diﬀerent assumptions on market structure and ﬁnds that they range from
about 1.3 to as high as 2.0, very much consistent with the lower-bound mea-
sures reported here.
As a ﬁnal example, consider the crackers category, in which we were able
to ﬁnd ten matching pairs of national brand and private-label products. Ac-
cording to table 7A.3, our preferred lower-bound markup ﬁgures are rela-
tively high, with the highest ratio for Nabisco premium saltines (2.84), and
the lowest for Salerno graham crackers (1.34); the overall category average
is 2.07. For four branded products, two Nabisco Premium saltines (diﬀer-
ent sizes) and two Salerno saltines (also diﬀerent sizes), the ratio exceeds
2.00. Only for two products is the lower-bound markup ratio less than 1.40.
The manufacturers’ lower-bound markup ratios (second column of table
7A.3) substantially exceed the preferred lower-bound ﬁgures. For example,
the category average of the manufacturers’ lower-bound markup equals
2.57, which is about 25 percent higher than the preferred lower bound.
Further, for Nabisco Premium saltines, the manufacturer’s lower-bound
markup ratio is 4.22, about 50 percent higher than the corresponding pre-
ferred lower bound.
It turns out that in the crackers category we obtain especially high
markup ﬁgures even if we consider the lower bound on the full markup ra-
tio calculated using only the retail prices. For example, according to table
7A.3 (column [3]), the category average of this markup ratio is 2.00, which
is the second highest (the toothbrush category being ﬁrst) among all nine-
teen categories included in our study. Individual product markup ratios cal-
culated using the retail prices range from the highest ratio of 3.12 for
Nabisco premium saltines to 1.20 for Salerno graham crackers.
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and private-label products, we ﬁnd that, as before, the retailer’s markup on
the private label is systematically higher than its markup on the nationally
branded product, with an average of 1.50 in contrast to 1.15, a diﬀerence of
about 20 percent.11
Next, consider some speciﬁc products that stand out in other categories.
In the canned soup category (table 7A.6), the only nationally branded prod-
uct with a preferred lower-bound markup ratio in excess of 2.00 is Camp-
bell’s tomato soup, with a ratio of 2.61. The remaining products in this cat-
egory attain a markup value of less than 2.00. In the cookies category (table
7A.9), two brand-name products, Nutter Butter peanut butter and Cameo
crème sandwich, attain a “preferred” lower-bound markup ratio of about
2.70, and another ten products attain markup values exceeding 1.40. In the
snack cracker category (table 7A.10), Nabisco Ritz cracker attains the high-
est preferred lower-bound markup ratio, 1.74, followed by Nabisco Ritz
Bits, with a ratio of 1.58. 
In the soft drinks category (table 7A.2), we ﬁnd that Coca-Cola Classic
and Pepsi cola attain preferred lower-bound markup values of 3.83 and
2.36, respectively. Other branded products with particularly high lower-
bound markup ratios in the soft drink category are Schweppes ginger ale,
with 3.52; Snapple strawberry and Snapple pink lemonade, with 2.88 and
2.47, respectively; Diet Pepsi, with 2.28; and Seagrams ginger ale, with 2.18.
Diet Coke attains a more moderate lower-bound markup ratio of 1.69.
Finally, the nationally branded products attaining the highest preferred
lower-bound markup ratios in the remaining categories include Motts ap-
ple juice in the bottled juice category, Minute Maid pink lemonade in the
frozen juice category, Crest Regular in the toothpaste category, Kraft soft
Philly cream cheese in the cheese category, Dawn lemon in the dish deter-
gent category, L.C. Baked cheese ravioli in the frozen entrees category,
Bounce single scented in the fabric softener category, Trac II Plus cart 10 in
the grooming products category, ultra Ivory Snow in the laundry detergent
category, quick Quaker oats in the oatmeal category, and Chicken of the Sea
lite tuna in water in the canned tuna category. 
7.6 The Role of the Materials Share
It might be worthwhile to hypothesize as to the determinants of cross-
category and within-category variation in the magnitude of markup ratios.
Consider ﬁrst the within-category variation. In most categories, we ﬁnd
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11. Slade (1998) assumes a 20 percent retail markup for saltine crackers in her study of price
adjustment costs at several Pennsylvania grocery stores. This is equivalent to a retailer’s
markup ratio of 1.20. The average retailer’s markup ratio on the nationally branded product
we report is 1.15, with the interquartile range of (1.12–1.17) indeed very close to what Slade as-
sumes.that more heavily branded and well-known products achieve higher mark-
ups. For example, Kellogg’s corn ﬂakes, Nabisco Premium saltine crackers,
Crest toothpaste, Coca-Cola Classic, Motts apple juice, Nutter Butter
peanut butter, Nabisco Ritz crackers, Kraft cream cheese, Dawn lemon dish
detergent, Bounce single scented fabric softener, and so on, which have the
highest markups within respective categories, all are heavily advertised and
widely recognized nationally branded products.
Perhaps a more interesting issue is the variation in markup ratios across
product categories. Basu and Fernald (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996) provide the following formula linking the gross output markups that
are the focus of this paper to the value added markups, via products mate-
rial share:











where  v denotes the markup on real value added, s denotes the intermedi-
ate inputs share in total revenue, and   denotes the gross output markup.
The formula implies that if the value added markup is to be ﬁnite, the gross
output markup must not exceed 1/s.
Nevo (2001), using data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers over
the period 1988–92, provides materials share ﬁgures for ready-to-eat cere-
als (SIC [Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation] 2043) and for the food indus-
try overall (SIC 20). For cereals, he reports a materials share of 26.5 per-
cent, which from the above formula implies that the gross output markup
should not exceed 1/0.265  3.77. Indeed, according to our ﬁndings (see ﬁg-
ure 7.1), the preferred lower-bound markup ratio for the cereals category
equals 1.41, well below the upper bound imposed by the above formula.
For the entire food industry, Nevo reports a materials share of 63.4 per-
cent. This imposes an upper bound of 1.58 on the gross output markup ra-
tio. Twelve of the nineteen categories we study would be classiﬁed as food.
These are soft drinks, crackers, canned soups, oatmeal, cookies, snack
crackers, cereals, bottled juice, cheese, frozen juice, frozen entrees, and
canned tuna. Of these twelve categories, the numerical values of the pre-
ferred markup ratios for the last eight categories fall below 1.58. For two ad-
ditional categories (oatmeal and canned soups), the markup ratio is only
slightly higher than 1.58. For only two categories (crackers and soft drinks)
does the markup ratio substantially exceed 1.58. This suggests that materi-
als share in these two categories must be smaller than 26.5 percent, which
seems reasonable. Moreover, the interquartile ranges we report indicate
that the great majority of the products in each one of the twelve categories
satisfy this constraint.
Finally, without having actual data on the cost shares of intermediate in-
puts used by manufacturers of individual food categories, we strongly sus-
pect that the products with the lowest markup ratios, such as canned tuna,
The Price Gap between Branded and Private-Label Products and Markups 201frozen entrees, cheese, frozen juice, and bottled juice, also have the highest
share of materials.12
7.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the size of markups for nationally branded prod-
ucts sold in a large U.S. retail supermarket chain. Our approach, which we
hope will serve as a complement to more structural econometric ap-
proaches, treats the wholesale price of a comparable private-label product
as an upper bound on the marginal costs faced by the brand manufacturer.
Using scanner data from a large Midwestern chain, we have computed var-
ious upper- and lower-bound markup ratios for over 230 products in nine-
teen categories. We found that markup ratios measured this way range from
3.44 for toothbrushes and 2.23 for soft drinks to about 1.15–1.20 for canned
tuna and frozen entrees, with the majority of categories falling in the range
1.40–2.10. Lower bounds on manufacturers’ markups are even higher.
Thus, the data indicate that markups on nationally branded products sold
in U.S. supermarkets are large.
Our approach oﬀers several beneﬁts. Because it involves only a simple
computation (once the data have been assembled), the method permits cal-
culation of markups for a large variety of products. It is transparent and
intuitive, and it oﬀers a benchmark comparison for more structural ap-
proaches. 
Particularly in light of the importance of markups in recent macroeco-
nomic discourse, one might ask whether the ﬁnding of high markups for
heavily advertised diﬀerentiated products generalizes to the economy at
large. In this direction, it is worth noting that many “commodity” products
such as automotive parts, personal computers and their components, and
many other producers’ goods come in both branded and nonbranded
(OEM or Original Equipment Manufacturer) versions, and that the price
gap for those products is comparable to that for the supermarket goods we
have studied. This is also true for other consumer goods sold outside the su-
permarket industry, home and oﬃce supply products being one example. 
Appendix
In this appendix we present detailed results for each pair of national brand
and private-label products, for each of the nineteen product categories in-
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12. We are grateful to Susanto Basu for calling our attention to the above formula and its
implications.cluded in our data set. The results are reported in separate tables, tables
7A.1 through 7A.19, by categories.
In these tables, columns (1)–(5) correspond to the ﬁve markup measures
we report in the paper, as follows:
1. Column (1) corresponds to the markup measure (a),   ˆ,   w hich is our
“preferred” lower bound on the full markup.
2. Column (2) corresponds to the markup measure (c),  w, which pro-
vides a lower bound on manufacturers’ markup by using wholesale prices.
3. Column (3) corresponds to the markup measure (b),  r, which pro-
vides a lower bound on the full markup by using retail prices.
4. Column (4) corresponds to the markup measure (d),  b, which is the
retailer’s markup on the nationally branded product.
5. Column (5) corresponds to the markup measure (e),  g, which mea-
sures the retailer’s markup on private label product.
In each table, the ﬁgures in parentheses indicate the interquartile range.
The sample size numbers, which are listed in the last column of each table,
report the number of weekly time series observations of price and cost data
used in calculating the various markup measures for the corresponding na-
tional brand/private-label product pair. See text for more details.
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The Price Gap between Branded and Private-Label Products and Markups 225Comment Julio Rotemberg
This is an excellent paper, which contains a trove of interesting data on
prices and costs. The thorough comparison between retail and wholesale
prices of both nationally advertised brands and comparable products sold
under private labels that the authors carry out turns out to convey impor-
tant lessons for many issues in economics.
The authors focus on a very important magnitude, which they call the
“ideal” markup. This is the ratio of the price paid by consumers for a nation-
ally advertised good and the marginal cost of both producing the good and
delivering it to the consumer. The gap between this price and this marginal
cost gives the answer to a standard microeconomics question. This is the ex-
tent to which the sum of consumer and producer surplus increases when the
ﬁnal price is reduced suﬃciently that the quantity sold increases by one unit.
This magnitude is also a critical ingredient in macroeconomics because it an-
swers the question of whether producers would continue to be willing to sell
and distribute their goods if, either because prices are rigid or for some other
reason, price falls by some percentage relative to this marginal cost.
Once one has the retail price of a good, one can obtain this gap if one
knows how much it costs to produce an additional unit and how much it
costs to deliver it to a customer. The paper’s solution to these hard mea-
surement problems is attractive on a number of counts. The authors sup-
pose that Dominick’s acquisition price of a private-label good that is simi-
lar to a nationally branded good is generally no smaller than the marginal
cost of producing and delivering to the supermarket an additional unit of
the branded good. They also suppose that the supermarket’s margin be-
tween the price it pays for the branded good and the price at which it sells
the good is no smaller than the supermarket’s own marginal cost of distrib-
uting the good. Thus, the sum of the private label’s wholesale price and the
margin on branded goods is an underestimate of the full marginal cost of
delivering an additional unit to the consumer, and the ratio of the price to
this sum is an underestimate of the markup they seek to measure.
Although no assumption that simpliﬁes calculations so much can be
valid 100 percent of the time, I ﬁnd this approach very compelling. Al-
though one might initially suspect that private-label goods are cheaper to
manufacture than branded goods so that their low wholesale price is not in-
formative, many of Dominick’s private-label goods proudly proclaim in
their package their similarity in content and appearance to well-publicized
branded goods. Indeed, one thing I would have liked to see is more soft in-
formation from the authors about the relative appearances of the pairs of
goods they consider. Broad surveys that show that good private-label goods
226 Robert Barsky, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Daniel Levy
Julio Rotemberg is the William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at Harvard
Business School and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.are quite often of high quality and not cheap to manufacture are in some
ways less compelling than particular comparisons for the goods in their
sample because private-label goods vary a great deal in quality.
Interestingly, the magnitude that seems harder to measure in this study is
the price paid by consumers, because the retail price the authors measure
does not include coupons and rebates. Still, it is quite clear that some con-
sumers pay the full retail price for branded goods at least some of the time,
so that the authors have a valid measurement of a particular ratio between
price and marginal cost. What is less clear is the fraction of the economy
that involves the high markups they ﬁnd in their analysis because, even
within this sector, many transactions involve smaller markups.
For macroeconomics, the ratios they consider matter because they mea-
sure how much price can be squeezed relative to marginal cost while main-
taining an incentive to sell. The authors’ calculation essentially supposes
that the retail margin cannot be squeezed, so that the entire ability to absorb
lower prices falls on the manufacturer. I see the ratio of wholesale prices
charged by branded goods and private-label goods as, in some ways, a more
direct measurement of the extent to which manufacturers of branded goods
would continue to deliver products even if their prices fell. It is thus good to
see these numbers reported as well, and it is interesting that they are similar
to those of their ideal markup.
Let me close by oﬀering some thoughts on the microeconomic implica-
tions of this paper’s ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that it is far from clear that the ideal
markup the authors compute says much about the extent to which branded
goods’ prices are too high from a social point of view. It is true that lower
prices would increase producer and consumer surplus, if advertising and re-
search and development (R&D) expenditures were held constant. However,
ﬁrms would almost certainly not hold these expenditures constant if they
were forced by an omniscient planner to lower their prices. It is more likely
that such a squeezing of margins would lower the manufacturer’s incentive
to carry out R&D and advertising. The resulting fall in R&D could be
costly, particularly because the fact that private labels free-ride on branded
products by copying their designs suggests that the incentives for R&D in
this industry may actually be too low. If advertising expenditures are so-
cially useful—as they can be, for example, in the model of Becker and Mur-
phy (1993)—reductions in these expenditures could be deleterious as well.
Once one focuses on R&D and advertising expenditures, the natural
question that poses itself is whether the ratio of these expenditures to other
costs is of the same order of magnitude as the ratio of branded wholesale
prices to private-label wholesale prices. If this is the case, one could con-
clude that these high markups are simply necessary to cover these addi-
tional costs. This in no way reduces the interest in the paper’s ﬁnding that
these markups are high, although it would suggest that rents in these in-
dustries are dissipated in a relatively straightforward way.
The Price Gap between Branded and Private-Label Products and Markups 227The paper also contains a second set of fascinating facts that raise im-
portant microeconomics issues. In particular, the paper shows that the ra-
tios of the four prices considered here for each pair of goods (i.e., the retail
and wholesale prices for both members of each pair) vary quite dramati-
cally across goods, even within narrow product categories. Trying to un-
derstand some of these variations seems extremely worthwhile. Indeed,
some of the relative prices reported here seem to cry out for explanation.
This seems particularly true of the “negative” margin between the retail and
the wholesale price of certain soft drinks. This almost makes one worry
about the authors’ ability to measure the amount that Dominick’s actually
paid for its products.
One source of variation in the ratio of branded to private-label retail
prices is obviously the extent to which branded products are seen as supe-
rior by customers (and this may explain the huge markups in toothbrushes).
Open questions fall into two categories, however. The ﬁrst is whether other
ratios, such as the ratios of wholesale prices or the diﬀerence in branded and
private-label retail margins, are also explainable in these terms or whether
they hinge on variables related to the manufacturing industry’s structure.
The other is whether any of these ratios, including the ratio between the re-
tail prices of the products in each pair, are related to the extent to which
there is price discrimination in each product. 
Reference
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy. 1993. A simple theory of advertising as a
good or bad. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (4): 941–64. 
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